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I .  Introducticn. The canon of major writings on politics includes a 
considerable number t h a t  claim to offer a new science of politics, or 
a new science of m a n  t h a t  encompasses politics. Arlc,totle, Hobbos, 
Hume, Publius, Con~te, Bentham, Hegel, Marx, Spencer, Burgess, 
Bentley, Truman, East.on, and Riker a re  amongst the  m a n y  who 
have clairr,ed, more or less directly, tha t  they arc  founding or 
helping to found a t rue  palitical science for the first tlme; and the  
rccent writcrs lean heavily on the tcrni "science. "1 Yet very  
recently, sorno of us assigned the title "political scien:iSt" havc been 
ti-il-ning returning to act.ivit ies that  many political  scientist.^, 
among others, regard as  unscientific--to the study of ins t i tu t i~ns ,  
usually in historical perspective, and to historica! ~ a ' l t e r n s  and 
processes more broadly. Some excellent scholars belie-ve this t u r n  is 
a disast.er. It has been t.ernlod a "grab bag of diverse, often 
conf!icting approaches" that  does not offer anything iike a scientific 
theory ( ~ k u b b  and Moe, 1990, p. 565) . 2  
In this essay I will argue tha t  the turn  or re turn  t.o 
institutions and history is a reasonable response to two linked sets of 
probicms. First, the dominant pluralist and functionalist approaches 
1 Thus William Riker in 1962, advocst.ing rational chcire theory as  
the basis of political analysis: "These traditional methods--i. e . ,  
history writing, the description of institutions, and legal 
analysis..  . .can produce only wisdom and nc'ither science nor 
kncwlcdge. And while wisdom is certainly useful in t h e  affairs of 
men, such a result is a failure to live up to the pror,ise iri t hc  
name political SL-~CPI~L-L-" (p. viii). 
2 1n this context, John Chubb and Terry Moc a re  defending t h e  
th~orct ical  superiority of economistic rational choice ~ - i ~ d e l s .  A 
Marxist scholar, Paul Cammack, has argued similarly against Thoda 
Skocpol's historical and institutional sociology. It leads, Cammack 
says, to abandonment "of any  kind of c0herer.t theoretical 
framewcrk at. all, in favour of rniddlc-lcvtl enquiries into a 
multipiicity of issues in a n~ultiplicity of s~ t t ings  in thg hope t h a t  
son:cti-li:-lg ;avrill t u rn  up.  Sti-1dic.s ~;it.cl;eC t.he n-lidd:~ of ncwhisre 
are not likely to lead anywhet-e" (~ammack. ,  1959, p.  267). Here I 
s u g g ~ s t  instpad tha t  studies pitchsd, not nowhcrc, but in a n u n ~ b e r  
of t heor~t i ra l  places a11 trying to account for colxmoE exp.cricnces, 
a re  more likely to be fruitful than  staking all on one %rand theory in 
advance. 
to political science had major limitations that  were exposed by 
political events of the 1960s and 70s. Second, a more fundamental 
tension has characterized the enterprise of political 'inquiry since its 
inception: the tension between convictions that  politics, and human 
agency in politics, really matter, and desires to exwlain politics and 
political decisions, almost inevitably in ' terms of exogenous, 
impersonal forces that may then seem far more important than 
"mere" politics. All studies of human conduct confront such 
conflicting pulls, between trying to  explain human agency and 
trying to preserve its intrinsic significance; but the problem is 
particularly acute for political scientists, who generaily believe 
political decisions are especially influential over virtually all spheres 
of human life, but who are particularly prone to analyze those 
decisions in terms of "non-political" forces, such as economic 
imperatives, psychological drives, or the largely pre-reflective social 
belicfs and cusio~ns that constitute a "culture." The unresolved, 
pel-haps unr~solvablc terlsicm between depicting political decisions as 
architectonic "first causes" and explaining their causes has quite 
understandably perennially prompted political analysts to seek better 
approaches. I will argue that reflectlon on how we rxight dzal with 
this central tension suggests not only why a turn to history makes 
sense but also how political scientists can do so most fruitfully. 
I nonetheless agree in part with the critics of recent 
. historical/institutionalist efforts. A t  their best, those efforts offer 
hypotheses and examine evidence for them in accordance with the 
traditional logic of scientific method. I f  that  is sufficimt to merit 
the term science, then they arc indeed scientific. But i t  is t rue that  
they do not now offer, or hold out much hope of offering, any grand 
overarching tht7i7~-y to guide a new sciertce of politics; and many 
believc that inquiry without. such a auiding theory is not yet 
science. It is sl~r?ly true that the enterprise of seeking such a 
theory is worth continuing and improving. The critics are quite 
wrong, howzv?r, to bolievo that the study of politics rhould be 
confil-ied to such efforts. To do so would almost certainly involve 
assuming sorr~e ultimately deterministic explanation is correct, thus 
eclipsing the question of the character and significance of human 
political agency. To be intellectually honest, political science should 
adopt I-114t.hods and a se l f - i_~ndc~-~t .a l -~di~ acknowledging that these 
fundamental questions are still very much open ones, unsettled by 
all past and present eiiorts to found ii t rue political science. 
For if it is not altogether wrongheaded, it. is surely premature 
to  treat any particular version of such science, or evcn the quest 
for a unifying scientific theory pm- st", as the one legitinlate claimant 
As noted below, I would opt for a less restrictive definition of what  
is required for analysis to be "science." As the title of this paper 
indicat.es, ilowever, I t.hink we can biz t.co obsesscd w,fk labels. 
to the throne of "true political science." There is no such rightful 
heir apparent; our pot.entia1 princes are all still frogs if they are not 
frauds. The most we can hope for a t  present is to achieve some 
shared sense of how we can pursue different sorts of approaches to 
the study of politics in ways t-hat help us to compare them, roughly 
but usefully--especially in regard to the enduring question of how 
we can understand human political agency. As I have argued 
previously, I think the institutional/historical turn in political science 
does suggest how we might achieve this (Smith, 1988a). I t  suggests 
not a single grand theory but an inclusive general approach, a new 
"non-science of politics" if you will, that can promote some 
meaningful accumulation of knowledge via comparison of different 
explanations for the common phenomena that most concern 
students of politics. the political decisions that seemingly must shape 
our lives if h u n ~ a n  beings are able consciously to shape them a t  all. 
11. The Fundamental ~ension.4 Let rne tleain with thc more 
t 
fundan'iental source of the recent turn in political stu-dies. Virt.ually 
. , .  
2 -Cr . . everyorie who writes about politics that I know about nas or once J .. 
I - had at. some level the conviction that the decisions made by persons 
in ' power, particularly in positions of government.al power, matter a 
A 
great deal. Such decisions alt.er the lives of most of the rest of us 
for good or ill, but significantly. Aristotle believed those who 
legislated for a polis had great infiuencc on the character and 
endurance of its shared life, so that politics was "the most sovereign 
and most comprehensive master science" [Ethics, 1094a). Hobbes was 
moved to writ.e, a t  least in part, by the incessant ciW.1 "disorders" of 
- .  his era, for which he held its political leaders responsible, at least in 
part (1971, p. 728). Even Marx, who stressed the determining 
c.harac.t~r of economic r~lat.ions in much of his work, granted politics 
important a u t o ~ o m y  in his historical writings and even more in his 
praxis. The various masters of American political science, from 
Madison to Merriam to Dahl, all analyzed politics with a view to 
enhancing, not denying, the efficacy of democratic statesmanship 
and citizenship (Seidelman and Harphanl, 1985). 
There the tension arises. How do we enhance the efficacy of 
political dec.ision-making, and (to be sure) also enhance the prestige 
and influence of teachers of politics, and (perhaps more deeply) aiso 
enhance our ability to cope with the curiosities and fears about 
rcajor political actions that we all feel a t  t!mes, some:!mes quite 
acut.zly'? One obvious answer is t.o seek for reliable, perhaps even 
This tension is not identical, aithough it is akin, to what Duncan 
Kenn~by at o m  time termed !he "iundamental contradlction" of 
hul-rlan cxistencz, our l~ngirlgs zt once to find ireedor:-I in social 
. forn-1s and to be free of social f o r ~ r ~ s .  (Kennedy has since disavowed 
this chiract~rization) {K~nnedy, 1979, pp. 211-12; 1914, p .  15). 
predictive explanations of how political matters regularly work, and 
how they can be expected to go if decision-makers do Z instead of A .  
Natural scientists seem, after all, to have learned much by 
exanlining tho physical world in these ways. In political analysis, 
such explanations usually trace conduct back to other factors, like 
economic interests; personal, group, or institutional power or status 
ambitions; the functional imperatives of social or political systems; 
religious, ethnic, nationalistic, republican, socialist, or other 
ideological c o n ~ ~ ~ i t . n ~ e n t s ;  psychic longings based on regressed trauma 
or eros; or simply human nature. These factors can best do the 
explanatory work we want from them, nloreover, if they are 
themselves relatively fixed and enduring, not subject to frequent 
fluct.uation or polit.ica1 alteration, inst.ead regularly exerting their 
shaping influence on the political landscape. I trust i t  is fairly 
uncontroversial to assert that such explanations are either explicitly 
provided or suggestcd in some or all of the writings of all of the 
aut hoi-s listed abcjvc, i't-~dced in vir t.ually all nna jor slvror k s  on politics. 
Yet without more; such explanations are all a t  least implicitly 
roductionistic and deterministic. They suggest political decisions are 
relativeiy predictatjle products of constellations of forces, be they 
econol~Iic concerns, systemic neecis, ambitions, ideologies, or erotic 
egos, that could not really be different than they are. Thus the 
decisions come to seem, in themselves, not all that interesting or 
momentous. They are not causes but effects, not "first things" but 
"epiphenomena", dogs wagged by their truly telling tzjls. 
Perhaps one clay some such explanatory theory l ~ r i l l  be judged 
essentially true. But a t  present, for a host of reasons, reductionist- 
deterministic sxp1ana:ior.s do not. satisfy. First, so far they mostly 
fail on their own terms. Most are difficult to express in well- 
specifizd, coherent theoretical modcls of measurable ~;olitical 
behavior that can be tested in replicable experin~ents (Ricci, 1984, 
pp. 250-58). Aristotle's conception of a constant if complex human 
nature is, to say the least, hard to operationalize. Marxist acc~un t s  
of class struagle find the modern kaleidoscopic array of relationships 
to t.he nleans of the production difficult to capture; group w~odels of 
politics have trouble modelling the behavior of all those who belong 
to several proups, and even more in finding a place fcr those 
asc.ribed membership in "latent," unorganized groups. And even 
b ' h ~ n  they see111 th~orctically elegant, as in the best. rational choice 
1-~lodlzls, conten-~poral-y sciel-~t if ic analyses of politic5 fail to explain 
n-iore tfiall a na-;-OW range of political behaviors: game t h ~ o r ~  
cannot easily be extended to "games" involving morc than two 
pal-ties, for exa~mp'1e (~roklelis, 1440, p. 579,) Neither have they 
displayed any great predictive capacity for major reai-world political 
choices: the t.in~ing of the collapsc of Soviet heaernon':; took most 
political scientist; by surprise. Indzed, all past efforts a t  grand 
explanatory theories of politics and political history that make 
predictions a t  all, from Marx to recent American "modernization" 
theories, have gone wildly astray. No swch theorists expected 
nationalism and religious f u n d a ~ n e n t a l i s ~ ~ ~  to resurge in the 
contemporary world, to give but one instance of e r ror .  
The current  proponents of historical/institutionai approaches in 
political science. have particularly, and appropriately, hammered on 
one descriptive failure of most prevailing brands of political science: 
they  tend t.o take their independent variables, be they  class, group 
interests and resources, ideology, e tc . ,  as fixed and exogenous to 
.political choices (March and Olsen, 1984, pp. 735-38; 1989, p. 6; 
Wondt, 1987, p.  356; Smith, 1988a, pp. 94, 100). That treatment is 
convenient, perhaps even necessary, for elegant scientific 
explanations, b u t  it just seerrts false. Such factors do .shape political 
decisions, but political decisions also seem to shape t-hem, often 
producing the  most fundamental sorts of political transformations; 
and SG all accounts that  fail to capture those c.ol-r-ipio:< :nt.~ractic;:ls 
a re  likely to fail in' i ~ ~ p o r t n n t  ways to explain politics. 
That point leads to the reasons t.he existing " s c i e r ~ ~ e s  of politics" 
appear inadequate to persons outside the enterprise of scientific 
inquiry, who rely on perspect.ives borne of lived h u m a n  experience. 
To most. such persons political decisions, to t a x  and spend, launch 
wars  or end them, redistribute crops or burn them, build roads, 
schools, hospitals, sometimes churches, or close them,  all seem to 
mat ter  ve ry  much, and they do not seem to be simply 
epiphenon~enal to anything else. To persuade us otherwise, a heavy 
burden of proof must  be met, quite appropriately. Nor do our own 
daily experiences of making choices seem reducible to single-factor or 
oven I-nulti-factor detern1inist.i~ explanations. We feel tha t  we, as 
mysteriously but meaningfully at-ltonomous agents, have  some 
independent causal role in shaping our choices. To tell us that  we  
don't m a y  be true, but it doesn't ring t rue to 2ersonal experience. 
Deep down, almost no one beiieves it.  And in this court  of appeal to 
personal experiences, which so often renders our governing 
judgrr~ents, i t  does not help the case for deterministic accounts tha t ,  
logically, they  give us no real basis to decide how we snould act.. 
They simply deny tha t  we really can decide. Thus they  can make 
the  whole absorbing if  often agonizing human  condition of endlessly 
trying to shape our livcs for the better seem a pointless farce. Since 
a concept ion of our condition as farc-ical threatens to f cst.er nihilistic 
depression and n ~ o r a l  irresponsibility, especially in poii?ics, most 
people rightly refuse to grant i t  veracity very  readily. 
Yet if we insist fir~mly on the independent, autonomous 
importance of human choices and particularly politica: decisions, on 
their irreducibility to explanation by exogenous factor5, on t.heir role 
in reshaping all such iactors, we arcl in dange-r of giving up the 
possibility of explaining political dt'cisions In a n y  rigorous way.  The 
11at.ure of this autono~nous agency is and perhaps mus t  be 
mysterious, requiring as it does tha t  we see ourselves associally and 
biologica!ly constituted but somehow uncaused (and thus  
unexplained) causes. Hence political analyses stressing such agency 
seem quickly to be limited to recounting how a number of 
apparently important decisions came to be made and w h a t  followed. 
in the manner  of a devoutly anti-theoretical narrat ive historian 
concern~d to lay down events as  they happened without a n y  
a t t .cn~pt  o build more general explanations of politics out  of those 
materials. The most such histories promise is tha t  we m a y  gain 
some prudence iron1 i~m-nersion in past experience (though we m a y  
also be misled, like the  architects of the Maginot ~ i n e ' ) .  But they  
typically fail to capture our frequent perceptions of recurring 
patterns iri political decisions tha t  appear traceable to forces which 
transcend a n y  particular sequence of events. And apzr t  f rom 
possibly bestowing a rather  ineffable prudence, political history told 
as one da1>-111 thing after another also fails .to give us any very 
concrete, reliable sense of what  we c.an do to understand and control 
our collective political lives better. So we may  we11 fez1 compelled to 
shift back to  explanatory theories tha t  are, at least implicitly, 
reductionist and deterministic if they have clear content a t  all. 
If this abstract  account of the problem of deciding on how to 
'onduct inquiry into politics is correct, then we should expect 
polit.ica1 analysts to oscillate between approaches closer to the 
character of deterministic, quantifiable theoretical models of 
causality in (some of) the natural sciences, and approaches t h a t  
lean rather  toward the tales of human agzncy found In nar ra t ive .  . 
histories. At this point. the reader will expect me  to claim to 
perceive precisely this deep d y ~ a r n i c  a t  work ir. the  recent t u r n  to 
hirtor-y and institutions in political science, and I do nc t  intend to 
disappoint. But I a m  not offering a single-factor causal theory; 
there have  bee!^ other and more proxiniate causes a t  -do~-k, to 
which I now t u r n .  
11. The Failures of Dominant Political Science Faradip,nis. A 
revealing aspect of the  recent trends in political science has been 
intensified concern with the history of t.hc profession itself. 
Histories, arid debatqs over histories, of part or all of American 
poiitical sc'ience and public administration turned fro1-r: a trickle t o . a  
gushing s t r cam in the  19805.5 .These studies v a r y  crjr;:iderably, but 
one near-universal theme is the tale of how American political 
C f .  e .g .  Crick, 1859; Somit and Tanenhaus, 1967, 1912; Kress, 1573; 
Karl, 197.1; Blondel, 1981; Gun~el l ,  1983; Collini, Winch, and Burrow. 
1983; Higgot, 1953; Ricci, 1984; Ward, 1984; Soidelmar, and Hsrpham, 
1985, Seidelman, 1990; Natchez, 1985; Janos, 1986; Farr ,  198t?a, 
1988b, 1990; Dryzek and Leonard, 1918, 1990. 
science originated with aspii-ations to be both truly scientific and a 
set-vant of democracy, aspirations abetted by deep faith tha t  these 
two enterprises went hand in hand. There were partial exceptions, ' . 
of course: John Burgess' cor~~parat ive,  historical political science . . 
adjoined a sharply limited conception of democracy underpinned by 
Darwinian views of nationalistic and racial struggle (Burgess, 1890, 
pp. vi . ,  3-4; Somit and Tanenhaus, 1982, p.  28). Woodrow Wilson, 
a seminal figure of modern American political science, nonetheless 
denied tha t  political studies could really amount to "science, " 
precisely because he believed there was a n  ineradicable element of 
a u t o n o ~ ~ ~ o u s  creativity in statesn~anship tha t  no science could 
capture. Wilson really differed only in emphasis from the outlook of 
m a n y  of his counterparts, however. Like them, he believed that 
scho!ars of politics could provide democratic citizens and st.atesmer1 
with the knowledge about inst.it.utions, issues, and altcrnat.ivcs t h a t  
was aSso!utcly necessary if democracy was t.o be feasible ( ~ i l s o n ,  
1911; Somit. and Tanenhaus, 1982, p. 78; Seidelman and Harphanl, 
1985, p .  41). 
IJnfortunately, this faith in the  joint destiny of scioncf and  
democracy has proven hard to sustain. For in American political 
science, the rnoro basic tensior~ between asserting the importancg of 
political agency and providing scientific explanations for it has 
especially been manifest in one way:  as a tension between desires to 
affirm and assist meaningfully d2nj~x-rafjc self-governance and 
desires to develop t ruly scientific a c c o ~ ~ n t s  of politics. The most 
influential scientific accounts have made democratic corn]-1-iitrnents 
appear naive by stressing the ignorance of voters and the apparently 
ineradicable power of economic, military, and professional elites, as 
well as  structures and forces beyond conc;cious hurr~ar.  control. 
Recurringly, this tension has fostered an  ironic a r c  to the  
career of leading p~lit ical  scia-~tists, f rom Arthur Bontiey and Charles 
Beard to Charles Merriarn to Harold Lasswell t-o David Easton and 
Robert Dahl. Early in their careers, these scholars all criticized 
previous forms of political science for being naive about democracy, 
primitive and inadequate as science, and consequently incapable of 
contributing greatly to  the cor~duct or reform of Arnerican 
democratic institutions. Each helped promote new eff0rt.s to create 
a t rue  science of politics, explicitly or implicitly confident tha t  it 
would help make rr~ore sopliisticated forms of democracy possible. 
Subsequently, however, each became dissatisfied with the results 
and methods of their intellectual progeny, for those works often 
disparaged thc feasibility of dcrr~ocracy, however conr:trl~ed, in 
prcfessional jargon inacoessibie to ~rciin-ary citizens. Thus, late in 
their careers, thew leading figures all turned away fram 
emphasizing the pursuit of a truly "scientific" political science, to 
5tros;irig the vindicatiori arid advancement of a more truly 
democratic polit.ic.5. Such iater works frequc.nt.ly hat'z Seen judgcd, 
in turn, naive and un~ciel1tific by younger proponents of yet 
another new science of politics. 
This cyclical pattern has been significantly modified by a 
secular linear one. Whereas Beard and to a lesser degree Merriam 
came to denounce excessive "scientism" in politics, even the 
possibility of a political. science altogether, the later figures have - not 
issued such explicit denunciations, and the self-understanding of 
political scientists as members of a disinterested profession pursuing 
scientific knowledge for its own sake has become more entrenched (a 
phenomenon to which I will return). Furthermore, from the time 
of Lasswell onwards, the concerns to aid democratic politics of 
political scientists like David Truman, V. 0. Key, J r . ,  David Easton 
and Robert Dahl in the 1950s increasingly came to center on the 
provisions of tools and insights t.o managerial "democratic" elites. To 
be sure, from the late 60s on Easton, Dahl and Charles Lindblom, 
amongst others, reinstant.iated t11~ older pattern of rrioving fro111 an 
early emphasis on scientific analyses (of syst.ems, group politics, and 
incre~--. , ,=n fi talist decision-making respectively) to explicitly normative 
efforts to furthclr democracy by criticizing the power of corporations 
and experts and promoting a better informed democratic citizenry. 
Generally, however, such figures have neither been quite so 
dismissive of political sci~ncc as Beard came to be nor so opt.imistic 
about the real possibilities for democratic  improvement.^ as Merriam 
seems to have remained. 6 
William Riker's writings are 'representative of how the cyclical 
pattern of moving from an err~phasis on science to deri~ocracy has 
been tempered by increased commitment overall to the study of 
politics as a scientific pursuit and the inevitability of elite 
predominance even in democratic politics. Since turr~lng to social 
choice theory, Riker has never abandoned his confidence that it is 
the right candidate to guide a truly scientific politics. He has, 
however, tried to show that although traditional demc~cratic idcals 
were unscientific and naive (particularly blind to cycling problerr~s), 
an admittedly more elite-dominated version of democratic theory 
can be developed and defended (1962, 1982). He has a130 recently 
written a rrlore popular work edifying citizens about the "heresthetic 
art"  of derrlocratic statcsrr~anship, an ar t  "free nlen use to c.ont.rol 
6 The p!-eccdil-lg thl-ez parag!-aphs are chiefly disti!l?,-J fri>1-ri the 
ov~r\riews provided by Crick, 1959; Purcell, 1973; Somi: and 
Tarl~nhal~s,  1982; Ricci, 1994; Szidelman and Harphan-., 1985; and 
Farr, 1988. East~c 's  ncted critiqtle of the profession, -,qhicfi stlll 
defends its scielitif ic character, is his Presidential address  asto ton, 
1963). The later works of Dahl and Lindblom, pursuir;g more 
claboratcly aspirations to inform citizens and combat c b ~ t a c l e ~  to 
dei-r~ocracy that have been visible throughout their careers, inclucle 
Dahl, 1985a, 1985b, 1989, and Lindb10111, 1977: 1990. 
their surroundings," which includes creative elements that  the 
science of rational choice can explicate but not generate or predict 
(1986, pp. ix-x). Thus Riker has to some degree retraced the 
intellectual path of Beard and Mcrriam, but now w.ith science and 
an elite theory of democracy more firmly in command. Many other 
contemporary political scientists are much more skeptical about both 
science, particularly in the form of rational choice theory, and 
democratic elitism, as we shall see.. But Riker probably typifies the 
modern profession's predominant trajectory on this issues prior to 
the recent turns to history and institutions, and perhaps still today. 
Here, I will not t r y  to re;rizw the specific objections each 
successive "new scientist of politics" raised against his predecessors or 
the exact. eierrients of the new version of science each offered. To 
k.ctp things manageable, let mc instead pick up the story with t.he 
approaches t.o politics that became dominant after World War 11. 
These are the forms t.hat recent scholars have tried to transcend. 
Most- h:stol-ians of the discipline agree that  the post-war era 
offered multiple incent.ives for political scientists to ident.ify 
t h e n ~ s ~ l v e s  axcil~siveiy as professional pursuers of objective scientific 
knowledge, The relative consensus on political ends and the 
desirability of liberal democratic political institutions during the cold 
war, leading to claims of "the end of ideology," made technical 
questions of means s een~  rfiore salient than debates over purposes or 
first principles. Enhanced faith in science and technology stemming 
fronl their military contributions reinforced the already enormous 
prestige of "scientism. " Gcvernment and foundations offered massive 
new support for scientific higher education and research. Thus the 
disciplin~ was able to grow as never before by presenting itself more 
as a purely acadcmic profession and more as a science (~urcell ,  
1973, pp. 237-240; Somit and Tanenhaus, 1982, pp. 145-47, 167-172, 
185-34; Ricci, 1984, pp. 112-13, 126-27; Seidelman and Harpham, 
1385, pp. 151-59). 
Tkie now-familiar label for the new science of politics of 'the 
1050s was "behavioralism, " but behavioralism meant many things. 
It usually indicated predilections for focusing on observable actions of 
political persons, rat.her than formal institutions or t.hose persons' 
public rhetoric and scif-understandings ("study what they do, riot 
what they say"). It also favored questions of description and causal 
explanation rather than quests to define moral st-andnrds and 
fiormstive ideals. But r11ost co~llmonly, bdiaviora1isl-n sinlplv 
renewgd calls for a scientific m~thodology of hypothesis formulation 
and en~pil-ical testing. The b~l-,avioralist "n-~ood" was t nus 
compatible with a range of outlooks on the primary phenomena of 
politics, and with no clear general outlook a t  all, only narrower 
hypotheses about specific aspec.ts of political conduct. 
Many believed that if political science were truly to be a 
science, such scientific met.hodr were not enough. Thz discipline 
needed an "operationalizable" guiding I ~ ~ L ~ L ~ I - ~ v  of what the primary 
factors in politics were and how they worked, from which more 
particular hypotheses could be derived. It needed, in short, what 
Kuhn would call a dominant "paradigm." It is generaily agreed as 
well that two (connectible) would-be paradigms came to  the fore as 
foundations for the new "behavioral" science of politics, the pluralist 
group theory of Truman and Dahl, harkening back to Bentley (and 
John ~ e w e y ) ,  and the struct.ura1-functionalism of Easton and Gabriel 
Almond, derived from the sociology of Talcott Parsons and, the 
anthropology of the 1920s.8 These perspectives each stood in 
opposition, above all, to frameworks derived from Marx: in the 
bipolar coid war world, Marsian analysis overhung the discol-~rse of 
American political scientists even though there were fzw highly 
prominent proponents (and perhaps r,o great grasp) cf it in the 
discipline (particularly in McCarthy's 1950s). 
The response of the new American political scientists was 
largely to show that contemporary politics did not meet Marxian . 
descriptions. True, groups and systems were often driven by 
economic int.erests, as Madison well knew; but they had a range of 
other interests as well, so that relationships to the means of 
production were not all-det.ermining. Moreover, modern American 
politics, a t  least, were too porous and multiply populated for any 
particular economic group or interest to prevail all the time. 
Generally, because of their contemporary focus, behavioral political 
scientists r~sponded less directiy to Marxian accounts of history. But 
when they sketched accounts of historic development, as in Dahl's 
review'of New Haven's history or V.O. Key's theory of realigning 
elections, they tended to write as if group struggle was a timeless 
mcdel for politics, wit.h a gradual broadening of the groups involved 
combined with a tendency for religious and racial clzavages to give 
Purcell, 1973, p. 240; Somit and Tanenhaus, 1982, pp. 173-83; 
Ricci, 1984, pp. 134-44; Scidellnan and Harpham, 1985, p. 151-53. 
These works review the leading atten-tpts t o  define "be'navioralisn-I." 
There were i ~ i p o r  tant differences bctween focusing on  "groups" and 
"systems," but the two modes of analysis could be linked, as Almond 
did, by treating "interest articulation" as a systemic function 
- pcrforlmcd by various sorts of intcrcst groups (~lmcrnd and Coleman, 
1960, p .  33; Almond and Powell, 1966,pp. 73-127). Much other 
influential work, such as the numerous analyses of voting behavior, 
could be read as identifying existing political groups and mapping 
their interests and electoral behavior, even when pluralist theory 
was not explicitly invoked. 
w a y  to "rational, " co~npron~isable socioecononlic interests over time. 
Almond's elaborations of structural-functional systerr~s analysis into 
a model of economic and political development also served as a n  
alternative theory of history, in which systemic adaptation and 
acquisition of some type of "modern, " Western-style political and 
economic institutions replaced class struggle and the ultimate 
tr iumph of the proletariat. In so arguing, both pluralists and 
systems analysts seemed to regard their models of politics a s  
applicable to virtually all times and places, with truncated historical 
or third world versions destined to flower into modern f ~ r r n s . ~  
There were always m a n y  critics of the new behavioral science 
of politics, advocates of a wide range of alternative modes of analysis 
and political perspect.ives, from surviving exponents of the older 
institutional-historical appl-oac-hes to conservative advocates of 
classical natural right to 1oft.ist scholars influenced by the Frankfurt 
School. Scholars agree tha t  the tunlultuous politics of the late 1960s 
and 70s strengthened the voices and the  credibility of these varied 
critics, particularly those decrying not on!y behavioral methods but 
the  character and institutions of American political life. The race 
riots, the politics of poverty, the ferocious protests over Vietnam 
met  by sometimes violent repression, the  mushrooming of the  
"counter-culture," followed in the 70s by Watergate and the relative 
decline of the United States' global economic and political status a f te r  
OFEC's embargo and the Vietnam withdrawal, all challenged 
prevailing politic.al science portraits of American and world politics in 
numerous ways. 
Insofar as they really existed, pluralist group politics did not. 
scorn so benign, since groups like blacks and the poor :night. bc 
harshly clxcluded; nor did such politics seem so transpsrently likely 
to endure. The "state" seemed more real and significant than 
pluralists allowed, for it appeared a t  once capable of initiating 
redistribution and of stifling popular protest movements, and i t  
could also falter int.ernat ionally with dangerous consequences a t  
home and abroad. Notions tha t  western states might altruisticaily 
lead others toward liberal democratic "modernization" seemed naive. 
Politics, moreover, did n'ot appear so fundamentally non-ideological, 
nor moral questions so obsolete. Thus in a conflict-ridden, often 
topsy-turvy era,  political science could persuasively be accused of 
offa-ins o111y static, compiacect, e th~ocen t r i c  n ~ o d ~ l s  tha t  did not 
9 ~ h o  above two parayraphs rely chiefly on Key, 1955, 1958; Alrnorid 
and Coleman, 1960; Aln~ond and Poyde!l, 1960, esp. pp. 34-451, 299- 
332; Dahl, 1961, esp. pp. 34-36, 59; Purcell, 1973, pp. 242, 260-66; 
S G I ~ I ~ ~  and Tanenhaus, 1382, pp. 188-89; Ricci, 1984, i24-25, 136, 
145, 155-57, 163-71, 214-17, 282-83; Sko~p01, 1984, pp. 2-3, 1585, pp. 
4-5; Seidelrr~an and Harpham, 1985, pp. 178-83, 193; McDonald, 1989, 
pp. 19-22. 
slnlpijr fail to ~ T G ~ U C ~  any  behavioral "laws," or to predict, explain 
or provide effectwe social guidance concerning the startling events 
occurring. To an  c~mbarrassing extent, the political science 
literature failed everi to discuss these topics. l o  
The support t h a t  events gave to critical perspectives in political 
science during these ye'ars ushered the discipline into w h a t  some 
have called the "post-behavioral" era, but tha t  label can  mislead. 
For one thing, much of political science continues much  as  i t  did 
before. Furthermore, the various protests swept together by th.e 
label have little in common beyond scme enemies. Hence even 
though m a n y  of the critics emphasized the importance of history, as 
we shall see, t.hey cannot plausibly be lumped together as  par t  of .a 
" turn to history. " , -  "Post-behavioralisrn" is best understood as  
describing a t ime period, not a n  intellectual school or approach 
   omit and Tanenhaus, 1982, pp. 230-33; Ricci, 1984, 7p. 189-90; 
Seidclman and Harpham, 1985, pp. 192-200). 
In fact ,  in t.he 1970s, the leading professional response to the  
perceived failings ,of behavioral political science probably was 
increased interest in the leading new candidate to pr~--,~idc a t r u e  
science of polit.ics, rational (or social, or public) choice theory, in 
both of its main variants, models of preference maximization and 
aggregation and game theory. Since the mid-705, virtually all the  
nation's leading departments have competed vigorously to recruit 
the leading scholars in rational choice. Their work has,  t o  be sure, 
evolved in ways tha t  a re  partially responsive to criticisms of earlier 
forms of behavicralisrr!. Most notably, Riker and others have 
abandoned their earlier disparagement of inst.itutiona1 analysis to 
champion a rational choics form of "nzw institutionalism" or "neo- 
institutionalisnl. " . Pioneered by Kenneth Shcpsle, t hesc analyses 
involve efforts to model how institutional rules and structures affect 
the  expression and aygrcgation of prcfe.rences? empottlzring some 
actors and at times resolving cycling problems. Riker and others 
have also shown how rational choice theory can illuminate t.he 
behavior of political actors, legislative bodies, and electoral systems 
in different historical periods ( ~ i k e r ,  1980, 1986; Cox, 1987; Shepsle 
and Weingast, 1987). 
From the  standpoint of non-rational choice proponents of a 
t u r n  to history and to institutions, however, such modelling does 
not really succeed in capturing the most important t3ings t h a t  
behavioralis~n 'missed. It still assumes the substance c~f political 
actors' preferelices arc f ixed by forces irr~perviouc, to pr-,liti(zai 
transformation, and it evaluates alternative instit uticns only in 
'@Easton, 1969; Purcell, 1973, p. 267; Sorilit and Tar~er?.haus, 1582, 
pp. 213-17; Ricci, 1984, pp. 175-78; Skocpol, i984, pp. 3-4; 1985, p. 
6-7; Seidel~nan and Harpham, 1985, pp. 118-38. 
terms of their effects on actors' efforts to maximize such 
preferences. If there were any. common denominators to the anti- 
behavioral protests, however, they probably were the complaints 
that in describing "mature" political reality as'group c~mpetition 
within "model-n" systems, political scientists had disrriissed the 
possibility of meaningful alternatives to such systems and such a 
politics. Many critics insisted that insofar as the behavioralists' (and 
rational choice) versions of "reality" were true, they should instead 
be seen as recent products of major transformations in quite 
different past political worlds, and as potentially subject to major, 
possibly radical transformation in the future (or even the present). 
Such transformations might not only involve the reconstitution of 
basic institutions, but also of the basic values and indeed the very 
identities of political actors. 
For some, these broader-ranging concerns called for a renewal 
of spcculativc political theory; but for lmany,. they ge-~,~e r asons for 
rncr? genuine t.urns to history. As Sheldon Wolin argl~ed at the 
.height of the assault on b~havioralisn~, the history of political 
regimes and of political t.heory was a superb storehous? of 
alternative political visions that might suggest diagnoses and new 
possibilities for the present. Furthermore, history might reveal the 
transforming forces that helped craft the politics of the present, 
forces that must be ur~derstood if the character and prospects of 
that politics were to bs fully comprehended (Easton, 1969, p . '  1058; 
Wolin, 196-9, p. 1077; Ricci, 1984, pp. 278, 311-12). 
Despite thzss protests, therz was no over-~helmir~g rush to the 
study of historical, processes or the history of political ideas in the 
1970s or 80s. The recent attgntion to th? history of thiz discipline 
itself may be a sign that scholars. are still searching t s  identify how 
and why political science has fallen short of its practitioners' 
aspirations. Nonethslt3ss, some "turns to history" were made that 
have steadily grown more ir~fluential. In history of ideas, the 
investigations of Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and especially the 
sometlme polltlcal scientist J .  G .  A .  Pocock have seemed to a wide 
variety of scholars to have actually uncovered an alternative 
political vision that might be of sorne use in the present. Their 
accounts of "civic humanism" or "republicanism" have suggest.ed 
that Americans are heirs to a neglected non-liberal legacy of more 
communit.arian, virtuous, perhaps even participatory po1itic.s. So~?ic 
pclitical scientists have subsequently joined the hist.orians' quest to 
shed light on modern politics by discovering how and how far  
republicanism became liberalism in America; others a re  engaging in 
speculation about how t.he desirable features of early republicanism 
can be r?captured today (Bailyn, 1367; Wood, 1972; Fazock, 1975; 
Lienesch, 1580; Haneon, 1985; Sandel, 1954; Sunst.cin, 1990). 
Especially since the 171id-19?0s, political theorists and historians 
of political ideas have also offered the discipline another sort of "turn 
.to history" with mounting influence: the "hermeneutical turn, " . 
inspired largely by "postmodernist" European critical theory. Those 
labels refer to an imposingly large and varied body of work by 
scholars like Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucalt, 
Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, expounded and extended in 
American political science by theorists including Charles Taylor, 
William Connolly and Michael Shapiro and reinforced. by the qualified 
advocacy of leading historians, of political ideas, notably Quentin 
Skinner (Skinner, 1369; Taylor, 1971; Connolly, 1974; Derrida, 1976; 
Foucalt, 1977; Habermas, 1979; Ricoeur, 1981; Shapiro, 1981; 
Gadamer, 1982). 
Two themes visible in much of this literature ar? particularly 
pertinent here First is an emphasis on the interpretxe character 
of all hul-r~an knowledge far from ever discovering objective laws 
nbol~t politics or i~deed  any other facet of our world, postmodernist 
thinkzrs stress how all accounts are only controversial, partial 
interpretations stitched together largely from other such 
interpretations, and often unified only by the interpreter's quest to 
irflpose on phenomena a sense and meaning the interpeter values 
Second, however, this apparent focus on "the interpreter" is 
undercut by an insistence that "the interpreter" and kLis senses of 
rrleaning are to a significant degree constituted by pre-existing 
langl~ages, interpretations and traditions that have been both 
spawned in and formative of a wide range of social contexts. Thus 
to more radical postw~odernists, all "interpeters" (that is to say, all 
human beings) may be understood as no more than particular 
congeries of interpretat ions e ~ ~ e r g e n t  out of the complex pageant of 
preceding human history In that unfolding drama, r-oreover, 
some perspectives have been forced into the wings, often brutally 
Hermeneutically-minded scholars do not concur on what all 
this inlplies for understanding human beings. Some strzss how 
appreciation of interpretive contexts helps us grasp th? intentionality 
of historical, human agents more fully; others suggest 
constitutive role of these contexts makes any such f o c ~ s  on "the 
sub.ject" obsolete. Still, most. agree that understandi~g humanity 
ir~volves, a t  least in part, grasping more fully the traiiitions, 
, -. . contexts and languages that have c.onstitutcd particu1~:- p~rsons or 
groups. That task is pursued largely by tzk.ing the di?!~ourse and 
actions such pel-sons ' ' ~ Q x ~ s "  a1ld unfoiding (ol- "dccoI-lst:-i;cting"~ 
. 
their constitutive eloments to approach, not a fu!: grz',? of tht3 
human world in which they errlerged, but, in Gadamer's 'ternl, tiie 
1effectivc..-his~orica1~~ world they can project for us. r e  
postmodernist scholars rest with such deconstruct-ive readings; many 
others enrich their interpretations via similar czngagerzent with 
cither "texts" corr~prising and cclmprised by the hic;t.orical contexts of 
the scholars' prirr~ary interests. These sorts of historical i~iquiries 
may help scholars see, for example, the ways in which one language. 
(of, say, professional psychology) has delegitilnated others (such as 
forms of political, cultural and sexual radicalism). Fcr all such 
post modernists, the quest for a positive, causal social science gives 
way to, or is a t  most a traniitional moment in, interpretive 
inquiries into historically-constit.ut.ed "texts" that encompass human 
politic.al action. Although still much more avant-garde than* 
mainstream and usually more centered on theoretical expositions 
than concrete explorations, hermeneutical works are proliferating in 
the discipline and are increasingly concerned with substantive 
interpretations of, for example, American political cu!ture (e.8. 
Hanson, 1985; Norton, 1986; cf. Ricci, 1984, pp. 275-88). 
Until very recent.ly, however, republican revisionism and 
hi;-rmoneutics were of interest almost exclusively to political 
theorists, not to empirically-171inded polit icai sc.ient.is?s. They were 
more impressed by perhaps the most influential assatiit on pluralist 
con~piacency, Theodore Lowi's End of Liberalism; and that work did 
include the contention that the pluralist politics of tho 50s and 60s 
were far from timeless. Pluralism was instead the genuinely 
modern product of historical forces, particularly the rise of a 
(deplorable) new public philosophy of "interest group liberalism" 
embodied in a (corrupt) Second Republic of the United States. On 
the whole, Lowi's work remained quite contemporary, with only the 
most broadly sketched historical arguments, so it only raised the 
questions of how American politics had been changed over time and 
what forces might change them in the future. But it5 success 
helped renew the receptivity of the discipline to studies that. explored 
how institutions (like the presidency) had altered through history, in 
wayr partly tractable to different historical concepti~ns of their 
pi-lr~)oszs: Many of those studies have been more historical than 
Lwdi ' s  ow11 work (Lowi, 1569, 1979, 1935; Ceaser, 1979; Tulls, 1987).11 
For empirical political scientists, a "turn to history" probably 
appeared even more clearly in works that identified themselvec, in 
the first instance as turning to institutions, specifically to the 
importance of "the state. " Calls to "bring the state back in," which 
quickly attractpd nunierous support.m-s and critics in the late 1970s 
and early 805, were traceable to the protes'ts of a few years before 
against the failure of prevailing behavioral accounts to comprehend 
what was then going on in the world. For example, Theda Skocpol's 
influential argument that state structures c.onditioned the character 
and fate of the world's major modern revolutiori~ was sparked by a 
concern to understand the obstacles. to revolutionary change facing 
n~ovements in America and elsewhere during her student days. 
11 Much of 111y ow11 work falls under this rubric ( ~ ~ m i i h ,  1985; 
1988b). 
T11ose obstacles (in, e.g.,  South ~ f r i c a )  emphatically seemed to 
include the role of states. She and others arguing for the 
importance of state structures and institutions generally have, 
however, typically come to that perspective through extensive 
immersion In history; and their arguments about institutions 
usually have to be made via history, via dic,cussion of fairly long 
periods of time (~kocpol, 1979, pp. xii-xiii, 1985; Skowronek, 1982). l2 
The reasons why the turn to institutions necessitates turning 
to history can be seen by considering the most ambitious effort so 
far to "theorize" a "new institutionalism" not limited to rational 
choice modelling, James G .  March and Johan P. Olsen's Rediscovering 
Institutions (1989)~ an expansion of their earlier, exceptionally 
influential American Political Science Revirzw article   arch and 
Olsen, 1984). Acknowledging that the "new institutionalism" does not 
offer any general guiding. theory as rational choice does, March and 
Ols~n indicate that "new institutionalist" studies are driven by a . 
nu~nber of linkzd intellectual dissatisfactions with the models of 
polit,ics that have prevailed in social science in the post-war era, 
including both behavioralisrn and rational choice. First, those 
models did indeed treat politics as "epiphenomena," affected by, but 
not significantly affecting, elements like "class, geography, climate, 
ethnicity, language, culture, economic conditions, demography, 
technology, ideology, and religion." Second, extending that point, 
the older models treated the "preferences and powers" of political 
actors as "exogenous. . . depending on their positions in the social and 
economic system," and not alterable by political deliberations, 
decisio~s, i~stitutions or processes. Third, but also ar, aspect of the 
same reductionism, bchavioralist and rational choice theories have 
treated syn?tois, ideologies, political visions, all essentially as political 
"devices" wielded on behalf of political actors' socio~conomic self- 
interests, not as matter3 of intrinsic value and importance. And 
fourth,. this PPI- ist tent disn~issal of the causal impor-tance of political 
life has ~cncrally been made credible by assuming that  economic 
and social systelr~s are functionally "efficient. " Less productive and 
st-able modes are assumed to be wceded out over time one way or 
the other; so if we know what constitutes a more efficient economic 
or social system (e. g . ,  liberal market systems), we can expect that 
socioeconomic (and thus political) systems will evolve toward such 
instit.utions in the long run, however politicians may choose in the 
short run (March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 3-4, 7-8, 48-52). 
In piace of these views, March and Olsen suggest that political 
actions and political institutions shape their environments even as 
l2 Terrence McDol-iald has a~~alyzed the influential urban politics 
literature by scholars including Amy Bridges, Ira Katznzlson and 
Mal-ti11 Shefter tha t  sin~ilarly brings "the stats" back ill, in the foi-1-11 
of the urban "nlachine" (McDonald! 1989). 
they a re  shaped by t.hem; i.Rat persons' resources ar.d very 
preferences a r e  often constituted by past political ac t ims  and 
institutions, which shapc the n~eanings persons find in their lives; 
tha t  these efforts to craft and preserve meaning are ,  as 
hermeneuticists of ten contend, as  much moving forces in political 
behavior a s  economic or social and political s ta tus  imperatives; and 
finally, t h a t  as a result, the actors and concerns tha t  shape history 
a r e  so multiple and complex tha t  historical processes cannot be 
captured by models of evolutionary efficiency . Socise?;onomically 
inefficient struct-ures and behavior do occur and endure, for other 
. sorts of reasons. 
Those, a t  least, a re  propositions tha t  "new institr_lt.ionalists" 
want  to defend. But to defend them,  they n ~ u s t  u r n  to history: 
They cannot otherwise show how past- a c t i e ~ s  and ir,siitut.ionr 
constitute the  powers and prsferences of a3erit.s in coritemporary 
politics, nor can they discern any  ac t~ la l  patterns of !-:;st.oric.al 
evolution tha t  may exist. even though sequential stages of effic.ient 
- . -- evolution do not. Thus whi!e some "new institutionalist" studies 
;p. focus primarily on thz present, ths; agcri13a of thc  institl_xtionalic,t 
.< '. t u r n  means that  on the whole, if political scientists accept these- 
.>. 
*,.. argurrients, historical inquiries I-I-lust proiiforat.e. 
. , 
We have now reached the multi-faceted recent. t u r n  to history 
in politic.al sciencp by way of its proxirr~ate causes. Let m e  indicate . . 
,?? 
here why  I believe these causes can legitimately be understood in 
terms of the deeper tension I described, as  dissatisfactions with a 
political "science" that  failed to capture how politics szznis so much 
' i ~  t.o mat ter .  The "post-behavioral" critics gained force, against 
powerful professional incentives to be a s   disinterested!^ scientific as 
possible, from vvpidespread beliefs tha t  contemporary plitical events 
were so inlportant as t.o render a political science neg;igent of then1 
indof~nsible. The quests for political alternatives these events 
triggered had as in~plicit pren~ises beliefs tha t  political actors can 
make meaningful choices of the sorts of political worlds they work 
for, and t h a t  t.heir choices have some real chance to reshape the 
world. Alt.hough the 0rowt.h of rational choice represented t-he 
continued appeal of a science of politics more than  ar. affirmation of 
agency, it did a t  least portray actors a s  rational calculators and 
instrumental chosers, even if their ends appeared to be beyond t.heir 
choosing. T!IP r c ~ c w e d  at-tentions to the  history of p;:?litical ideas, 
public philosophies and polit-ical culture, to adrninic,trat:ive 
institutions and to "the state," all expressed similar sznses tha t  our 
beliefs about politics and our cmt ra l  governing instit~:ions do mak? 
a dif fcrelice. All of March and O ~ S ~ I I ' S  dl-gul-lle~~ts, rl-~creover, clearly 
rest or1 tl-:P belief that  politics ~ ~ ~ a t . t e ~ - s ,  tha t  socio~c~!-~.:.rr!ic 
rcduct i o ~ ~ i s m s  arc  inadequa t . ~ ,  bccausc politics rcsi-1a~c.5 other a s p x t s  
of our social world, including our powprs, preferences, and very 
s ~ n s c s  of lneaning, and hel-ICP affects a11 historical c!cv?!opl?Ient. 
The turn .to history and to institutions in politicai science, 
then, do2s seem to manifest the basic tension between developing 
scientific explanations, which behavioralism ardently tried to  do 
even if it faiied, and vindicating our sense that politics matters, 
which behavioralism disputed, at least implicitly. Moreover, since 
many critics on the right and the left also identified themselves with 
the vindication of a more .genuinely democratic politics than the 
American status quo of the late 60s and 7Os, the critical assaults also 
manifest the more particular tension in American political science 
between commitments to science and democracy. The 
"science/democracy" formulation seems inadequate, however, since 
so much contemporary scholarship suggests that even if politics 
rnatters, meaningful democracy may not be attainah;?. 
As that point implies, thus far the scholarship making these 
turns cannot boast of -any great progress in resolving zither of these 
profol~nd tensions. In regard to scholars' more specifically 
democratic aspirations, rational choice theorists, again, have 
explicitly concluded that only a quite elitist version of "democracy" 
is possible. Thus Riker's more popular work edifies about democratic 
statesmanship, not citizenship. Many advocates of republicanism 
have instead hoped for a more truly democratic, participatory 
polity; yet their work suggcsts that if classical republicanism was 
ever present, it is irretrievably lost in the privatistic, commercial, 
inegalitarian modern world. Often postmodernist critical scholarship 
promises to democratize human affairs, by debunking the truth 
claims of dominant views and showing the insights in marginalized 
ones; but frequently the final lesson is that prevailing forms of 
political interpretation and culture are unalterably hezemonic. Lowi 
has repeatedly called for a more truly democrat.ic "juridical 
democracy, " and writers l i k ~  Skocpol and Skowronek have clearly 
wished to probe ways stronger but more fully democratic states can 
be achieved. But their writings tend to imply that the dominance of 
self-seeking and unequal interest groups over American institutions 
cannot be broken, and that Americans are. not likely t o  achieve a 
much stronger state unless it is much less democratic. 
Furthermore, insofar as these works are explanatory, they 
tmd implicitly to minimize human agency just as m ~ c h  as previous 
explanations did. Rational choice models limit us to q:~estions of 
means, not ends. Ideologies, public philosophies, prevailing 
interpretations and languages either seem still puppets of 
socioeconomic forces, or they are t herr,selv?s prisons cf C O ~ S C ~ O U S ~ ~ S S  
that control and limit political actors rather than constituting them 
as effpctive, autonomous agents. Structures, in~ludir~g "state 
structures" that come close to being reified as autonomous entities, 
severely constrain if  they do not altog~ther displace "voluntarist" 
features of political life.13 Sensitive to these problems, ."new 
institutior?alist" writers like March and Olsen and Skocpol have 
increasingly called for approaches that give due weight to both sides 
of the "dialectic of meaningful actions and structural determinants, " 
but how one does that remains very problematic. The various types 
of "turns to history" I have canvassed offer quite different answers. 
Rational chpice analysts of hi.3joricai developments not only 
reduce the realm of "meaningful actions" simply to strategic actions 
on behalf of politically unalterable preferences. They also take a 
narrow view of those preferences. Although in principle we might 
value mything, rnany rr~otives are hard to define or measure 
precisely. Much of this scholarship avoids those problems in practice 
by assun-ling that wz are motivated chiefly by wealth and power or 
status, appal-mtly as a result of r~latively unchangeaSle human. 
bioiogical and psychological structures. Taking such structures as 
givesn, rational choice theol-ists then illuminate only the rational 
calculations they dictate, without undermining their dictatorial 
status by expioring whether agents have some power to reshape 
those structures conscioilsly cver time. 
All the other perspectives 1 have noted represent more genuine 
"turns to history" in that they do see the character and preferences 
of political agents as developed and changed through historical 
processes; but they conceive of those processes in significantly 
different ways. At th2 other cnd of the current inte!kctual 
spectrum from rational choice, hermeneutical scholars tend t.o 
portray agents as constituted primarily by historicaliy ovo:ving 
languages and traditions that offer standards of intrinsic 
mear~ingfulncss and therefore give the conduct of agents a dimension 
not captured in models of instrumental rationality on behalf of 
economic or status interests. Scholars of "republicanism" and the 
rise of 111odm-n "intcl-cst group liberalisn~" also stress the role of 
changing public ideologies in shaping agency, action, and outcomes, 
a t  least implicitly. But they generally have greater faith that they 
can portray the interact ions between traditions of public philosophy 
and "external" socioeconomic developments than do pure 
hermeneuticists, who see ianguages only as self-referaitial systems 
of signs. The "new institutio~~alists," in turn, are wil!ing to 
encompass languages and ideologies a3 kinds of structures or 
institutions, but they usualiy place more emphasis ori the 
determining role of political organizations as traditionally understood, 
especially state bureaucracies. Hence these approaches do suggest. 
some ways niezningful actioris can reshape structural contexts, but. 
13 Skocpol's initial nlethodologicai manifesto explicitly called for 
"nonvoluntarist structural" perspectives, al thou~h ~ h c .  has 
subsequently stressed "the interplay of rrIeaningfu1 actions and 
structural contexts" (1973, p. 14; 1984, p.1). 
they suggest different ways, and few analysts have compared these 
varied perspectives systematically. Such comparisons are  not helped 
by the fact that  none of these approaches 1s very clear about how 
we when or whether languages, ideologies, or structures are  
determining the constitution and actions of agents, h r~w far they are 
instead subject to conscious alteratior, by such agents. or just what  
IS meant by their "dialectical interaction. " 
These differences and ambiguities are reasons I think the 
critics are right to assert that the turn to histo'ry has produced no 
clear and compelling overarching theory of structure and agency 
that  can guide empirical analysis (or normative. argu3ents) .  That 
is why some believe recent developments have only exacerbated 
what they see as the increasingly worrisome state of ?he discipline. 
Gabriel Almond, among others, has characterized political science as 
a profession marked by increasing balkanization, with devotees of 
true social "science, " especially rational choice, ever rriore greatly 
polarized from the assorted "historical approaches" reviewed here, as 
well as more traditional behavioralism. The historicai approaches, 
moreover, are feared to sacrifice scientific rigor in favor of fuzzy, 
indeterminate, belle-lettristic "explanations, " without providing 
anything that  can better advance the case for human political 
agency, particularly via democratic politics. Hence we are now 
hearing the gloomy indictments of the "new institutionalist" tu rn  to 
history cited a t  the outset (~kocpol, 1984, p. 4; Almond, 1988; 
Smith, 198Sa, pp. 92-101; March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 16, 46). 
111. A Possible Future for Historv. It seems to me that  the "new 
instit utionalisrr." has much more prorr.ise than its crl?ics allow, 
although I hold out little hope for the' emergence at last of a 
definitive new science or grand theory of polit.ics. T k i ~  leading 
con te~der  at. present, rational choice theory,, obtains tlegance and 
simplicity by advancing a narrow, unpersuasive view of political 
agency, and its in-~plausibility is not compensated by zny  great 
predictive potmr. But nrcither do I think political science will 
fiourish best if it continues as it on the whole does ncl;vr: often w e  
corr~placently answer doubts by invoking the desirability of a 
pluralistic discipline and suggesting that over time, the  competition 
of ideas will automatically winnow out better from pcxe r  accounts 
of politics, or else virtually all approaches will be seen to capture 
truths a t  different but compatible "levels," such as tne scientific 
"levelf' of physical cau~ai i ty  and the hermcngutical "levelt' of 
rymbolic meaningfulness. 
That colnplacency cannot be justified. A sort of col-1- petition 
surely occurs, but it is usually not one in which persms attentive to 
all forl-ns of political analysis choosg the types that pl-me most  
powerful The discipline is already so fragn~e!lted that its different 
sc.hools of thought rarely compete directly, offering rival accounts of 
the same phenomena to the same audience. Instead, adherents of 
different outlooks write and judge largely anlongst then~selves.  Their 
relative professional s ta tus  is greatly influenced by t h e  extent to 
which they find prestigious like-minded audiences in other corners of 
the intellectual world outside the discip!ine, like economics, 
philsophy, or literary theory. There is no guarantee tha t  the most 
intellectually powerful forms of political science will find equally 
influential. external audiences; nor does this form of competition 
encourage cross-fertilization among different approaches. Occasional 
suggestions that  we embrace almost all approaches as illuminations 
of t ru th  at different "levels, " moreover, risk being fatuous. The 
various approaches a re  advancing opposed views of t h e  character 
and driving forces of human  agency. .If they can norietheless be 
sho'wn to be somehow compatible, it cannot be done by fiat. 
This survey does suggest, however, tha t  the multiple flavors of 
political science do have certain things in common. Aithough those 
things are  quite general, I believe the discipline can build upon 
them.  As I have endeavored to show, virtually all political 
scientists have always shared the basic concerns I described a t  the  
outset. . They generally begin with beliefs tha t  politics matters  
greatly, but they differ over the character of human  political 
agency, and most if not all offer theories of such a g e m y  tha t  
exp1icit:y or i~nplicitly minimize the independent significance of 
political decisions. I therefore think political science should put these 
issues center stage, a position they intrinsically meri t .  Throughout 
the disciplinz, political scientists should vlew their descriptivp, 
explanatory inquiries as  means to help us  decide whether political 
agency really is governed by specifiable deterministic causes or not, 
and -rvrnether political decisions really ma t t e r  or not, instead of 
assuming affirmative or negative answzrs to those q1;clstions. 
Since investigators: do have to construct theories tha t  supply 
hypothetical answers to those questions in order to pursue 
productive research, this admonition is ultimately mrJst aimed a t  
how they appraise the results of particular inquiries; but it does 
have implications for how political scientists should &sign their 
research. They need to strive consciously to take advantage of the 
fact that  by and large they do share a com,mon subject mat ter ,  
phenomena tha t  virtually all recognize as' polit.ics. That 
commonality gives: the discipline the potential to address these 
central issues In a variety of ways tha t  nonetheless cohere enough 
to produce some c u ~ n i ~ l a t i v e  knowledge. To exploit t h s t  potential, 
poiiticai scientists should think of the field not as  committed to any  
on2 theory but as colr~rnitted to systematic corr~parisons of 
alternative theories and accounts of their common subject mat ter ,  
to see what  can be lcarr~ed about political agency. Arid the w a y  to 
do that  is for political science to take as  its central unlts of analysis 
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not classes or groups or systems or instrumentally rational choices 
per se, but rather,  a s  Skocpol and the new insti tutio~alists suggest, 
the more general "struc ture-agent" problem itself: t he  interaction of 
(possibly) influential structural contexts and the (possibly) 
meaningful actions of political agents 
Political science will most progress, I believe, if researchers 
consciously design their work to be describable by t h a t  quite general 
formulation. Particular studies, t o  be sure, may well focus on the 
role tha t  classes, game theorizable strategic interactions, or other 
elements play in political life. But political science as  a discipline 
should demand of all such investigators first, t ha t  they  facilitate 
comparisons of their substantively and methodologically distinct 
inquiries by studying phenomena they think to be po!;tically 
important and know to be so v~ewed by proponents of other schools 
of thought, who m a y  therefore also study those phenomena 
Second, researchers should seek as much as  possible t3 examine a 
range of political phenomena, and to sample tha t  range if necessary, 
wlthout blassing their results by chooslng phenomena c.r samples 
tha t  best suit their hypotheses or theories. Third, s c k ~ l a r s  hould 
specify clearly the structural contexts, agents and decisions they a re  
examining and their hypotheses concerning their relative roles. And 
fourth, in evaluating their results, they should indicate explicitly 
how successful they have been in finding results consistent or 
inconsistent with the  existence of deterministic causal mechanisms, 
and give some attention to how the political conduct they  have 
examined may have altered the contexts of future pol!tical action. 
I f  scholars complied with these precepts, then t h e  discipline as  
a whole might be better able to  accumulate some knowledge of how 
well models em~has iz ing  different causal contexts account for the  
sarxe political decisiofis and actions; of how well differsnt structures 
seem to account for ranges of political conduct; of where political 
scientists have found behavior tha t  simply does not seem well 
captured by  a n y  deterl-ninistic account; and of how those apparentiy 
autonomous actions, in particu!ar, have affected the 7olitical world. 
Political scientists then might be able to pursue even more complex 
questions concerning when different structural  cor,tex:s a re  most 
salient, how tney interact, when and how more genuinely 
autonomous political conduct seems to occur, and wha t  broader 
historical patterns, either cyclical or developmental, can be 
discerned and explained in light of this knowledge. A t  some point, a 
granci ih401-y 01 politics, including a n  account of historfcal 
d e v ~ l ~ ~ p r r ~ z n t ,  r~~ight ,  rr-gmergz; cr ,  i f  significantly a!: t onornous 
human  agency seems to be present, political scientists might 
u~d2rs tar .d  miore sure!y why  such a thcory cannot be formulated. 
In the  interim, political scientists could view their prcfession not as 
troubled, confused, or conflicted because it lacks a paradigm, nor as 
sirr~ply offering an  eclectic pluralis]-n tha t  m a y  or m a y  not work 
toward greater unity of its own accord. Rather, the profession 
would be self-consciously united by common concerns with t ruly 
important issues and by comparable but not identical methods tha t  
p ~ r n ~ i t  i t  to make some progress toward better cumulative 
understanding of those issues. 
Political science was once unified, at least to some degree, by 
sharqd familiarity with the traditional canon of great works in 
political philosophy, and sollie readers m a y  wonder how such texts 
would fit into the sort of discipline I a m  describing. 1 believe they  
.would be central to i t ,  in a t  least two ways. First, great  works of 
political theory arguably craft or a t  least articulate memorably 
structures of political ideas that  m a y  themselves be causal factorsin 
political developments, a possibility t h a t  'can be cxplored through a 
,combination of careful textual readings and empirical historical 
inquiries. Second, by presenting powerful alternative views of 
po!it.!c-s, the canon of great works can serve as  a n  inv.2luable guide 
for significant theories and hypotheses about how politics operates 
r:?99 and what  alternate arrangements might be feasible, . thus helping 
? .  
$?;. 
empirical investigators avoid both reinventing wheels and wallowing 
.. 1   I -  
tx" in trivia. As I have argued elsewhere, these hypotheses could well 
", ! include notions about the  existence and impact of a n y  ultimate 
moral reality tha t  m a y  exist, as well as  more mundane factors.14 
f . 
2 . .  
I Few will be persuaded of all this, however, without more 
!!: , effort to address the obvious ambiguities and difficulties in the basic 
forn~ulat.ion I have offered, "the interact ion of (possibly) influential 
i ' ., st.ructura1 contexts and (possibly) meaningful actions of political 
agents." Questions immediately arise concerning the terms it 
employs. What counts as  "political"? What. count a s  "actions"? 
What sorts of things a r c  eligible to be consider3d "agents," what  
"structural contexts"? The answers will rightly be cor!testeb, which 
in itself argues for inclusive definitions. Let nlc nonetheless tender 
some suggestions. 
"Politics" should center on the  apparent exercise of power by 
human  beings over each other, recognizing t h a t  power has m a n y  
faces and t h a t  deterministic theories m a y  ultimately indicate tha t  
none of us exercises power 11-~caningfully at  all. Mor~over ,  the field 
should give considerable attention to the struggles cver the possession 
14 The discipline should also continue t.o encompass m a n y  forms of 
normat.ive inquiry and argument. All such efforts inzvitably take 
50!7ie 5tz11-ICC 01-1 the charact.er and significance of poiiti::.al agency, 
but I would not burden normative t.heorists with t.he duty  of 
providing empirical support for their assu~nptions in every work. For 
dcbate over whether the sorts of descriptive work 1 am advoc.at.ing 
can actually assist normative inquiry, as  I think, see Smith, 1988a, 
pp. 105-06; 1989, pp. 74-87; Barber, 1989, pp. 56-73. 
and use of governmental power that  a re  a t  the center of common 
sense notions of "politics," a t  least until we have v e r y  strong 
evidence t h a t  common sense is wrong and those struggles a re  not 
particularly significant. Doing so seems intrinsically wise, and it 
would also help generate different analyses of the  same  phenomena, 
promoting comparison of various types of work. I would, however, 
certainly also include the exercise of power in non-governmental 
contexts, such as  families and corporations, a s  aspects of "politics." 
Next, although m a n y  things might be considered "actions," it 
is probably most productive to focus on concrete political decisions, 
choices, and practices, such as  electoral votes, enactrr.ents of 
statutes, series of judicial rulings, the commencement of military 
engagements, revolutionary insurrections, and other exercises of 
violence, etc.  Again, such conduct falls well within t h e  core of most 
definitions of political action and therefore research directed toward 
well-specified sets of such decisions will facilitate comparisons of 
different approaches. A constant danger, admittedly, is tha t  forms 
of "politics" or "political action" that seem important only from 
minority points of view will be neglected, even though they  m a y  
ultimately seem most decisive. But there a r e  few perspectives tha t  
do not view a s  significant a t  least some decisions t h a t  most other 
perspectives would also single out, and it does not seem too much to 
ask researchers to be sure to address those decisions in their work. 
"Agents" should also be defined broadly to include possible 
actors like classes, s ta te  agencies, nations, etc. But in principle, 
every political account should ultimately be able to explain how the 
conduct of actors t h a t  a re  in some way aggregates of individual 
human beings, such as states, is related to, though r.ot necessarily 
reducible to, the  decisions and actions of those human  beings. 
Every account should a t  least aspire to heip us see t h e  operations of 
the factors it stresses from the standpoint of our worl:ir of lived 
experiences, which a r e  always worlds of people. 
"Structural contexts" ought to  b~ conceiv~d as  including 
virtually everything tha t  might be reasonably postulated as 
influencing h u m a n  political conduct: gemtic structures,  structures 
of psycholcgica! drives, enduring governmental institutions, economic 
relations and technologies, distributions of military power, a r rays  of 
org.311ized prcs.:sl-;!-p groups, lal-iguages, ideological persuasion5 or 
t r ad i t i~ns ,  mass cultural attitudes, etc . Again, refusing to pi-lrport 
to have a privileged general thocry of politics rules o ~ t  assuming the 
correc txss  of existing clairris for some of these factors; i t  does not 
ruie out their exploration. Thus most practitioners gf existing 
political science approaches wou!d c,irnply be urged to gresent their 
preferred independent irzris5lcs as hypcthctically influczntial 
structures shaping specified dzpendent variables, certain sets of 
po!itical decisions by identifiable political actors. Then researchers 
would be asked to present their empirical evidence tha t  these 
docisiol-IS were indeed consonant with the hypothesized influences of 
the  structures they en?phz~ize.  
All this sb far can rightly be seen as no more than an 
endorserlent of the traditional scientific logic of hypothesis 
specification followed by honest efforts a t  empirical fa!sif ication. 
Nonetheless, these suggestions a r e  neither uncontroversial nor 
trivial. Some nlay feel uncomfortable describing their independent 
variables as "structural contexts," but I cannot see h s w  doing so 
works important substantive distortions on a n y  existing body of 
theory.  Indeed political scientists of virtually all stripes use such 
language a t  least occasionally. But more than  semantic difficulties 
will arise. Rational choice theor'ists, for example, often concentrate 
on modelling the interaction of structures and decisions. They tend 
to ass-urne certain structures of preferences and "rules of the game" 
and then to work out mathematical expressions of strategic 
calcuiations or aggregation processes. Some theri look simply for 
enlpircal instances of such behavior in the world. A t  times their 
substantive cor?cern is to s h ~ w  how actors can deal wi th  difficulties, 
such as  cycling problems, generated most clearly by t h e  rational 
choice theorist's assumed premises. On the approach recommended 
here, they would be more pressed to model decisions ?hat  other 
schools of thought on politics view as  worth explaining and to 
ccnside; how w ~ l i  their theories accounted for fair sarriples of the  
full range of relevant phenomena in the world. These pressures 
might also lead them to begin more often with empirically visible 
institutional ru!es and s t r l~c tu res  of preforencer (althci~gh m a n y  now 
do so). Traditional behavioraiists more consistently explore partisan 
a:-id gcvernl-rlcntal conduct that rr.ost agrez is c e ~ t r a l  to politics, but 
both they afid rational choice scholars tend to ignore quests to 
obtain arid preserve meaning (beyond possess-ion of wealth and 
power) as  important parts of political behavior. They would be 
encouraged to consider hypotheses about such quests a s  legitimate 
members of the discipline's family of potential explanations (as, 
again, m a n y  a re  increasingly doing). 
The dismissive attitudes of some traditional ewipiri~ists are ,  
however, partly explained by the way  students of meaningful 
ideologies, particularly the  hermeneutically-minded, oiten 
theri~selves disnriss any  need to describe very precisely the 
structures of consciousr~ess they a re  alleging to be infiuential, or to 
hypothesize specifically about how those structul-es shape identifiable 
actors and decisions. A t  times some writers suggest t h a t  one can 
nn!y judge a hr?rmcrneutical account by intuitive decisinns about 
whether the proffered interpretations resonate with one's own sense 
of meaning. But whether or not this is so, scholars can still specify 
the  ideological or linguistic .structures they perceive as constituting 
the consciousness of political actors or the meaning of political 
c~nduct ,  and they can ll~dicate the political actions, or a t  least the 
rango of possible political actions, that should follow if their 
interpretations have force. I f  their accounts really capture or 
explain something about intersubjectively recognized political 
decisions that others miss, they should be able tell us quite 
concretely what they believe that something is. Finaliy, scholars 
for whom the turn to history means chiefly "bringing the state back 
in" would on this approach not be able to center research on that 
enterprise alone. 
Furthermore, the approach I a m  advocating has another stage 
that is compatible with but not necessarily included in the 
traditional logic of scientific method. As my colleague Alexander 
Wendt has written, the interplay of structural contexts and the 
actions of political agents may take several basic forms. We can 
conceive of structures as being determinative of agents' behavior; 
agents as instead determining the const~tution and OPE!-ation of 
structures; or of structures and agents as somehow "co-determining" 
or "mutually constitutive" (Wendt, 1987, pp. 337-39). We can, 
moreover, flesh out the nature of those determinative or mutually 
determinative influences in innumerable ways. 
We might, for example, think of some structure, say a system 
of economic production, as determining all the basic political choices 
of agents like coal miners. We might instead think t t~e i r  relationship 
to the economic system determines a particular range of coal 
miners' political decisions, such as their plainly economic ones, but 
not other sorts of po!itical d~cisions, such as support for government 
aid to religions. Or we might think of economic relations as 
constituting actors like coal miners with certain interests and 
capacities that make a specifiable range of political behaviors 
probable for them, without determining any of their concrete 
political choices. (or, of course, we may deny that a struct.ura1 
context, such as the system of production, has anything much to do 
with those agents' character and choices). We may also think in 
any of these cases that the decisions and practices of the political 
actors have some great.er or lesser effect on the structure with 
which we began: coal miners might lead a rr~ounting series of 
general strikes that finally overthrows existing economic relations. 
But the more we seQ the original structure as determining the 
dccisiocs of the political actors in qu~stfon, the less w z  are likely to 
see. t.hcse decisions as n ~ a t  ters of interest. in their own right.. 
Although th? discipline shoi~lci not bo c.onfincd to iiny 
particular c.ot~ception of the "t.ri-ie" structure-a~ent reiationship, it 
should be co~mrnitted to exploring both aspects of it, not only the 
 effect.^ of struct.urcs on agents but. also thcse of agcntr or, structures. 
Thus, beyond urging that  political scient.ists specify their projects in 
thcsc t.enI'1S of structural fact-ors, political agents, and hypotheses 
about their interaction, I a m  suggesting tha t  we regularly do some 
further work.15 Part  of the time, in separate projects if necessary, 
researchers should focus on the second half of the interaction, on 
how political 'decisions, particularly those tha t  appear relatively 
autonomous, have affected the actors' environments, 'particularly 
,those structures tha t  political scientists consider most important.  
B y  regularly looking for actions for which deterministic explanations 
seem to run  out and a t  the consequences of those actions,, political 
scientists can gain a n  improved empirical .grasp of w h a t  significantly 
autonomous political agency looks like and how important i t  is in 
historical political developments and transformations. That 
k~owledge is crucial if we are  to judge better whether and how far 
political .decisions really do matter  and understand better the  
political agents making such decisions. 
. Once we include in the profession's agenda investigations not 
only of how various s t ruc t~i ra i  c o ~ t e x t s  hape po:itical.agents and 
important political decisions, but also how far those agents 
reconstitute their contexts, i t  should be clear why  the  sort of "new 
institutionalist" approach I am advocating must be historical. 
Although individual studies might still simply model t h e  operations of 
particular structures in contemporary politics, the concerns of the 
disciplirie as  a whole would include appraisal of whether and how 
the constitution of both structures and agents have t e e n  and can be 
transformed over time via their mutual  interaction. Work t h a t  
explores the possible existence of a n  ongoing, transformative dialectic 
between structures has to involve historical analysis, consideration 
of a t  least one and often more instances of a "structures to decisions 
to9 structures" chain of events. Moreover, such historical analysts 
a re  probably well advised to attend not only to "normal politics" 
within various regin?,es but also to the "extra-ordinary'! politics of 
revolutionary and founding periods, for these are  the times when we 
a re  :nost likely to find political actors altering not only their 
strategies but their ve ry  senses of political identity ar.d purpose, 
even as they creates institutions and policies that  may dramatically 
reorder the political lives of their communities. And zgain, political 
scientists might work over time toward more general theories of the 
role of various structural  contexts and political agents in shaping 
historical political development and triggering such t ra~sformat ions ;  ' 
although if meaningfully autonomous human agency does in fact 
play a significant role in human history, we should riot expect any  
~vera rch ing  theory on the order of classical Marxism or  structural- 
f unctiona!ist rnodcrniza tion theory to be plausible. l6 
15 For a sinlilar suggestio~, see Wendt, 1987, p. 364-65. 
16 For useful rcflectio~~s 011 how "new institutionalist" historical 
aciocfit5 arc marc likely to portray "multilayered" histories 
mapping ten~poraral  alignn~ents of independently developing "orders" 
in different facets of political life, see Skowronck, 1993. 
I f  the various turns to history in the contemporary discipline 
do lead political scientists to forms of, work approximating those I am 
describing here, a not wholly unrealistic expectation since most 
existing modes will not have to undergo any dramatic revisions, I 
believe the turns will have significantly strengthened the discipline. 
Political scientists will be able. to preserve their existing 
accomplishments while also addressing the calls to consider how 
political institutions and actors might be transformed over time that 
have properly come to greater prominence in the "postbehavioral" 
era. At this point, however, some will wonder how such a political 
science differs from history, and if it does not, whether it should be 
termed a sociai science at  all. 
These are large topics, and as 1 am seeking to conclude, I do 
not wish to take them up i r ~  depth here. Let me br i~i ly  observe 
that., although such a political science would not in rriy view differ 
much fro111 what many good historians do in practice, it v~ould be 
Inore dedicated to explicit use of traditiona! scientific niethods of 
theory and hypothesis formulatlon and fair testing, and it would 
focus more consistet~tly on discovery of t:he causal influences of basic 
structures or lack thereof, than most traditional narrative histories. 
Despite my title, 1 firmly believe the methods I describe merit the 
name "science." But for those who insist science involves not only 
such methods but also the assumption of deterministic behavior or 
the singleminded quest to elaborate one comprehensive. theory of the 
phenomena under study, I acknowledge that the political science I 
propose would fall short of their demands, a t  least for thc 
foreseeable future and probably always. Although some would call 
the resulting "non-science" a violation of the promise the discipline's 
name implies,. 1 do not think such names alone should determine 
what tasks wc set ours~lves. I suggest that, whether or not we call 
it a science, there is much to be said for an intel1cc.tual discipline 
that eschews premature reliance on obviously partial theories in 
order to encourage a diverse array of co~tiparable inquiries into 
matters that virtually all regard as both vital and urxettled. I 
believe, in fact, that it is an appropriate expressicn of the best 
scientific spirit t o  conceive o! our enterprise in terms t!lat leave 
open questions open, constraining research only by what is required 
for effective con~municat.ion and collective analysis of our results. It 
is also art appropriate expression of tflc human spirit t 2  refuse to 
rule out in advance the possibility that what many oi us hope and 
believe about politics, that t!rrouqh it pmp!c can 1uak.2 a ~ : ~ ~ P I - G . ! I C C  
in their lives, rilav acti~ally turn out to be true. 
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